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INTERSTATE POLLUTION AND THE
QUANDARY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Cedar H. Hobbs*
Current Supreme Court personal jurisdiction analysis does not clearly support a
finding of personal jurisdiction for out of state polluters in an interstate toxic tort. Still, some
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have attempted to find personal jurisdiction in these cases,
but in doing so have employed tenuous analysis that can result in inconsistent case law. This
Note argues that there is a better analytical framework which reemphasizes the role played
by territorial borders in personal jurisdictional analysis. Through employing this framework,
courts can find personal jurisdiction in interstate toxic torts while also preserving analytically
consistent case law.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Professor Mathias
Reimann for your candor, insight, and support. Thank you also to Ruthie Wu, Matt Piggins, and Jonathan
McKoy for your thoughtful and comprehensive edits.

205

206

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................207
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................208
A. A Primer on Personal Jurisdiction .................................................... 208
B. The Foundation of Personal Jurisdictional Analysis ............................ 208
C. “Stream of Commerce” Analysis ........................................................211
1. World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson ....................... 211
2. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California ............ 212
3. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro............................................... 214
D. The “Intentional Tort” Cases ........................................................... 215
1. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine .................................................... 215
2. Calder v. Jones....................................................................... 216
3. Walden v. Fiore ..................................................................... 217
II. INCONSISTENT ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATED ............................................ 219
A. Cases That Support a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction........................ 219
1. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. ..................................... 219
2. Triad Hunter, LLC v. Eagle Natrium, LLC ............................. 221
3. Ex parte Aladdin Manufacturing Corporation et al. ................... 222
4. Considering the Cases Together .......................................... 223
B. A Case that does not Support a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction .......... 223
1. TV Azteca v. Ruiz ................................................................ 223
C. A Summary: How Toxic Torts Can Create Inconsistent Outcomes
.................................................................................................... 224
III. A BETTER FITTING FRAMEWORK ...................................................... 225
A. Focusing on the State is a Better Way to Analyze the Minimum
Contacts Requirement..................................................................... 226
B. Fair Play and Substantial Justice is Easily Satisfied ........................... 228
C. Purposeful Availment Is Not Required for a Finding of Personal
Jurisdiction if We Have a Territorial Touchstone .............................. 230
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 232

Fall 2021

Interstate Pollution and the Quandary of Personal Jurisdiction

207

INTRODUCTION
At the outset, it is useful to consider a hypothetical. The Hobbs Industrial
Company (“Hobbs”) operates a concrete production plant in Michigan. The plant is
situated next to a river, which the company uses for a variety of purposes, including
waste disposal. In violation of relevant environmental statutes, Hobbs knowingly
dispenses of concrete discharge into the river, despite knowing that this discharge
could result in downstream water contamination. Hobbs is also aware that the river
runs into Ohio and provides water to several municipalities along its banks.
Evidently, one of these municipalities, the City of Cedar (“Cedar”), starts to feel the
effects of these discharges: the river, once teeming with fish, seems to yield fewer
and fewer fish each year; the riverbanks are sullied with municipal signs warning of
toxic discharge, and water treatment costs spike and increasingly contaminated
drinking water leads to a spur of illness among Cedar’s residents. Frustrated by the
loss of a once great resource, the City of Cedar decides to sue Hobbs in Ohio state
court. Hobbs responds by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Currently, Supreme Court jurisprudence does not appear to clearly support
a finding of personal jurisdiction in the hypothetical outlined above. Still, some
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have found for personal jurisdiction in interstate
toxic torts but have been forced to employ tenuous analysis in reaching that result.1
Personal jurisdiction analysis has immense implications for this type of
litigation. Generally speaking, if a defendant were to avoid personal jurisdiction in a
state they do not reside in, they would avoid certain costs associated with out of state
litigation, or even the litigation wholesale. As a matter of social policy, we generally
want jurisdiction in the state where the individual or body (the City of Cedar, for
instance) incurred the harm for a variety of reasons, including administrative
concerns, efficiency, and fairness.2 But, the law does always map onto these policy
goals, as is the current case with personal jurisdiction and interstate toxic torts. This
disconnect between social goals and the law is even more pronounced in cases
involving interstate water pollution, which has existed since the early days of America
and is still prevalent today.3
This Note contends that personal jurisdiction can be found in these types
of cases through a framework that reemphasizes the role played by territorial borders
in personal jurisdiction analysis. Ultimately, this framework allows for a finding of
personal jurisdiction in interstate toxic torts while still producing analytically
consistent case law. Section I of this Note provides a limited introduction to personal
jurisdiction and outlines the legal context concerning two subsets of personal
1.

See generally Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018).

2.

Cf. Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 578.

3.
See generally Jouni Paavola, Interstate Water Pollution Problems and Elusive Federal Water Pollution
Policy in the United States, 1900-1948, 12 ENVIRONMENT AND HISTORY 435, 438 (2006); Pakootas, 905
F.3d 565; Triad Hunter, LLC v. Eagle Natrium, LLC, 132 N.E.3d 1272 (Ohio 2019); Ex parte Aladdin
Mfg. Corp., 305 So.3d 214 (Ala. 2019).
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jurisdiction in Supreme Court case law—stream of commerce (or products liability)
cases and intentional tort cases. Section II then addresses the current split in case law
to illustrate inconsistencies in personal jurisdiction analysis. Finally, Section III
provides a more effective framework for addressing interstate toxic torts and personal
jurisdiction and will discuss what we can learn from this new framework.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Primer on Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is the ability of the state, through its courts, to
adjudicate disputes over a particular person or property.4 Without jurisdiction, the
presiding court cannot proceed, and if it does, the subsequent judgment will be
invalid and thus carry no legal weight.5 The Supreme Court has determined that
personal jurisdiction is an inherently constitutional question, in essence, because the
Due Process Clause limits states’ exercise of jurisdiction.6 Accordingly, Supreme
Court case law is precedential.

B. The Foundation of Personal Jurisdictional Analysis
Historically, personal jurisdiction has been limited by territorial borders
and “due process of law.”7 Pennoyer v. Neff, the bedrock case for personal jurisdiction,
established the theoretical framework for what is now coined the “territorial power
theory.”8 There, the Supreme Court outlined a foundational framework for personal
jurisdiction:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, many of the rights and powers which originally
belonged to them being now vested in the government created by
the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that
instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of
independent States, and the principles of public law to which we
have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is,
that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
within its territory. . . . The other principle of public law referred
to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can

4.
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 20 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter Richman et al.].
5.

Id. at 21.

6.

Id. at 25.

7.

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).

8.

Richman et al., supra note 5, at 30.
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exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. . . . And so it is laid down by jurists, as an
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation
outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so
as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.9
Essential here is the court’s determination that a state’s jurisdiction
over persons (i.e. personal jurisdiction) was limited to physical presence within
the state’s borders.10 Thus, an Ohio resident who had not set foot in Michigan
could not be sued in Michigan. A court could only exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant if the defendant resided within the forum state’s borders, or if the
defendant voluntarily chose to appear in the forum state.11 Pennoyer thus stands
for the proposition that personal jurisdiction can be exercised for in state
defendants, or for the sake of concision, “insiders.”12
This emphasis on physical presence within a territory led to a limited
approach to jurisdiction, creating a myriad of issues for courts as advancements
in modern technology led to more and more interstate litigation.13 This issue
was particularly pronounced for out of state defendants, or “outsiders,” forcing
the courts to stretch the framework.14
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court established a new
foundational test for personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.15 In this case, the State of Washington had an unemployment
compensation scheme largely funded by employer contributions.16 The
defendant, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Missouri, specialized in
shoe sales.17 The business employed salesmen throughout the U.S., several of
whom resided in Washington and solicited business there.18 Following the
defendant’s failure to contribute to the fund, the State of Washington sought to

9.

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added).

10. Note though that this is fairly simplistic; jurisdiction could have been found had the defendant
voluntarily appeared in the forum state’s courts. See id. at 714, 720.
11.

Richman et al., supra note 5, at 31.

12.

See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.

13.

Richman et al., supra note 5, at 32.

14. Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (“[T]he state may declare that the use of the
highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process
may be served.”).
15.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

16.

Id. at 311.

17.

Id. at 313.

18.

Id.
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compel the defendant to contribute to the fund through suit in Washington.19
The defendant, in response, argued that it was not amenable to suit in
Washington as it was neither a Washington corporation nor did it conduct
business with the state.20 Historically, and prior to hearing this case, the
Supreme Court had endorsed the fiction that a business was present where they
did business.21 Recognizing that it was time to retire this fiction, in International
Shoe, the Court held that for a non-resident, or outsider, to be subjected to
personal jurisdiction, they must have had “certain minimum contacts with [the
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notices
of fair play and substantial justice.”22 This holding became, and continues to be,
the hallmark personal jurisdiction test.23
The Supreme Court in International Shoe then proceeded to outline
relevant factors for evaluating the “minimum contacts . . . fair play and
substantial justice” test.24 The Court noted that the test was not mechanical or
quantitative; rather, it was important to look to the “quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws.”25
Accordingly, factors to be considered in the test included the “estimate of the
inconveniences” in forcing the defendant to appear in a state other than their
own and whether the defendant had exercised “the privilege of conducting
activities within a state” such that “[they] enjoy[ed] the benefits and protections
of the laws of that state.”26
International Shoe remains the dominant jurisdictional paradigm and
subsequent cases have sought to apply its holding to a variety of different fact
patterns.27 It is therefore an important foundation for interstate toxic torts as it
deals explicitly with outsiders. Conversely, Pennoyer v. Neff, while foundational,
does not support a finding of personal jurisdiction for outsiders on its own.
After International Shoe, there existed two distinct tests for outsiders
and insiders. For outsiders, the International Shoe test of minimum contacts
19.

Id. at 312.

20. Id. at 314 (The defendant argued that “mere solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods
within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled by shipment of the purchased goods interstate,
does not render the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state.”).
21.

See Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1927).

22.

Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.

23. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2013) (“[T]he nonresident generally must have ‘certain
minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316)).
24.

Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.

25.

Id. at 319.

26.

Id.

27. For example, it has been applied in products liability cases. See generally McIntyre Mach. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). It has also been applied in intentional torts. See generally Walden,, 571 U.S.
277 (2014).
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applied. For insiders, Pennoyer territorialism applied. Although this dual
paradigm was not clear for many years, it was later confirmed in Burnham.28
There, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, held that physical presence in a state
was sufficient for a finding of jurisdiction.29 The Court characterized physical
presence as “the touchstone of jurisdiction” and further stated that “the short of
the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system.”30 The
Court further held that the minimum contacts standard was “developed by
analogy to ‘physical presence.”31
As our hypothetical concerns out of state defendants (Michigan
defendants sued in Ohio for the effects of their actions taken in Michigan), we
look to “outsider” case law. There are two general subsets of “outsider” Supreme
Court case law that are relevant to interstate toxic tort litigation. The first is the
“stream of commerce” cases, where the Court has grappled with products
liability across state lines. The second is the “intentional tort” cases, where the
Court has addressed intentional torts arising across state lines. The following
sections will discuss these subsets in succession.

C. “Stream of Commerce” Analysis
Stream of commerce cases generally address the interplay between personal
jurisdiction and a growing national market. For our purposes, this Note will discuss
three relevant cases to illustrate the analysis. As a note, the analysis below will be
confined to the “minimum contacts” prong of International Shoe, as the fairness prong
will be discussed at length in Section IV.

1.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson

In World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, a family residing in New
York bought a car from an auto dealer in New York.32 The following year, the family
left New York to move to Arizona.33 While driving to Arizona, they were rear ended
by another car in Oklahoma, resulting in a fire that harmed the couple and their
children.34 The family subsequently sued a myriad of defendants in the chain of
distribution, including the distributor and the retail dealer in Oklahoma state court,

28.

Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).

29.

Id. at 619.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 286 (1980).

33.

Id. at 288

34.

Id.
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alleging defects with the car.35 The relevant issue was whether the Oklahoma state
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the distributor and retailer when their
only connection to Oklahoma was the car sold in New York to the plaintiffs.36 In a
6-3 decision, the Court held that personal jurisdiction was not warranted.37
Specifically, it concluded that defendants had “no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma”
and jurisdiction could not be based “on one, isolated occurrence . . . [where] a single
automobile, sold in New York . . ., happened to suffer an accident while passing
through Oklahoma.”38 World-Wide Volkswagen built on the holding in Hanson v.
Denckla, which held that the exercise of jurisdiction over an out of state defendant
required that the defendant “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”39 Because the New York distributor and retailer in World-Wide Volkswagen had
not conducted any activities within Oklahoma, personal jurisdiction was lacking
there.40 Thus, territorial borders matter for stream of commerce cases. To be forced
to appear in another state, it is not enough that a defendant sold a product that
foreseeably could end up in a different state, even if that product is inherently
mobile.41
Under World-Wide Volkswagen’s analysis, the outcome under our
hypothetical is unclear. World-Wide Volkswagen’s holding applies when a third party
moves the object in question, such as a car. In our hypothetical, an actual stream, not
a third-party, moves the pollutant. Thus, the holding in World-Wide Volkswagen does
not easily map onto our hypothetical.

2.

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California

The second of the stream of commerce cases was Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California, which was decided in 1986.42 The plaintiff had a
motorcycle accident in California.43 He alleged that the accident was a result of a
defect in the motorcycle’s tire tube and subsequently sued various defendants in the

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 289.

37.

Id. at 295.

38.

Id.

39.

Hanson v. Denckla, 375 U.S. 235, 253. (1958).

40.

World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295.

41. Id. (Foreseeability of a product ending up in a different state “alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction,” though it could still be a relevant factor in considering personal
jurisdiction.).
42.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1986).

43.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
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tire’s chain of distribution.44 The plaintiff eventually settled with all of them.45 But,
one of the defendants, Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese manufacturer of tire tubes, sued
Asahi, a Japanese company that manufactured and sold valve stems to Cheng Shin.46
Cheng Shin sued Asahi in California for indemnification and contribution.47 The
question presented was whether California courts had jurisdiction over Asahi in this
secondary action.48 In a unanimous decision, the Court found that personal
jurisdiction was lacking, but split 4:4 with regard to the reasoning.49 Although the
Court unanimously agreed that the valve stem had reached California through the
stream of commerce, it was split as to whether the stream of commerce alone was
sufficient for a finding of personal jurisdiction.50 Writing for the Court, Justice
O’Connor concluded that the stream of commerce hook was insufficient in and of
itself.51 Instead, the defendant had to have purposefully availed itself of California;
or simply put, created some additional connection with California (such as
advertising, marketing, etc.) to exercise personal jurisdiction.52 This requirement of
an additional connection can be colloquially construed as “stream of commerce plus.”
The Court held that “the placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.”53 It further clarified that “awareness that the stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
product into the stream into an action purposefully directed toward the forum
State.”54 The Court concluded that personal jurisdiction was wanting, as the
defendant did “not do business in California . . . or otherwise solicit business in
California” and, because mere awareness is not sufficient for personal jurisdiction,
there was no evidence that the defendant had directed any actions towards the
State.55
Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus framework does not provide
for personal jurisdiction in interstate toxic torts. While the river (or stream) carried

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 106.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 105.

49.

See id.

50.

Id. at 104.

51.

Id. at 112.

52. Id (“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct . . . may indicate an
intent to purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market
in the forum State, advertising in the forum State . . . or marketing the product through a distributor.”).
53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.
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the pollutants into the forum state, the defendant did not do anything additional to
create a connection with Ohio and thus could not be said to have purposefully availed
itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Ohio.

3.

McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro

The third and final of the relevant stream of commerce cases was J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a 2011 case which further clarified the stream of commerce
plus test.56 The plaintiff, a man from New Jersey, was injured in New Jersey while
using a metal-shearing machine manufactured in England.57 The plaintiff
subsequently sued the English manufacturer of the metal-shearing machine, J.
McInytre, in New Jersey state court.58 J. McIntyre had little if any connections to
New Jersey.59 It had not marketed goods in New Jersey nor shipped them there; in
fact J. McIntyre did not sell any machines to the United States save for sales to one
distributor, who had sold one of the machines in New Jersey.60 The question
presented was whether the New Jersey courts had jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.61
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court found personal
jurisdiction was lacking.62 The defendant had not “engaged in conduct purposefully
directed at New Jersey,” as the defendant did “not have a single contact with New
Jersey short of the machine in question ending up in this state.”63 Thus, even though
the product had arrived via the stream of commerce, J. McIntyre had not
“purposefully availed” itself of New Jersey.64 In essence, the opinion in McIntyre v.
Nicastro served to confirm the stream of commerce plus analysis proffered by the
plurality in Asahi.65
Taking these cases together, the product, or pollutant, cannot be the only
tie between the defendant and the forum state for a finding of personal jurisdiction.
It is not enough to send a product or pollutant into the stream of commerce; the
defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum state, whether it be through
marketing or designing a product specifically for that state. In interstate toxic torts,
purposeful availment will generally be lacking and thus stream of commerce analysis
will not support a finding of personal jurisdiction.

56.

McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

57.

Id. at 894.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 895-98.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 876-77.

63.

Id. at 886.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 886-87.
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D. The “Intentional Tort” Cases
An additional subset of Supreme Court jurisprudence applicable to
interstate toxic torts can generally be deemed the “intentional tort” cases. These cases
address interstate intentional torts. They do not rely on stream of commerce
connections, but instead apply when the defendant does something to the forum state
or someone in the forum state.

1.

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine

The first of these cases is Keeton v. Hustler Magazine.66 Hustler Magazine,
an Ohio corporation headquartered in California, sold its magazines throughout the
United States.67 Five issues included allegedly libelous articles about Kathy Keeton,
a New York resident.68 Keeton then sued Hustler Magazine in federal court in New
Hampshire for libel.69 Hustler Magazine’s connections with New Hampshire
consisted of the monthly sale of “some 10 to 15,000 copies.”70 Given these facts, the
Court unanimously found for personal jurisdiction, reasoning that “Hustler
Magazine [had] continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market
[and thus] must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action
based on the contents of its magazine.”71 Hustler Magazine’s “regular monthly sales
of thousands of magazines [could not] . . . be characterized as random, isolated, or
fortuitous” and thus a finding of minimum contacts was warranted.72 Implicit in this
language was a recognition of the Court’s willingness to be less stringent in its
personal jurisdiction analysis with intentional torts as compared with negligent
actions. For instance, the Court recognized that the bulk of the harm had occurred
outside of New Hampshire, “but that [would] be true in almost every libel action.”73
Keeton thus suggests that if a defendant creates a connection with a forum State and
commits an intentional tort within that state, they will likely be subject to personal
jurisdiction there.74

66.

Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).

67.

Id. at 772.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70. Id. Note that the New Hampshire market only accounted for a small portion of Hustler
Magazine’s sales. See id. at 780 (“It is undoubtedly true that the bulk of the harm done to petitioner
occurred outside New Hampshire”).
71.

Id. at781.

72.

Id. at 774.

73.

Id. at 780.

74.

Id.
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Keeton also held that the location of the plaintiff was somewhat irrelevant
to the personal jurisdiction analysis.75 The Court determined that personal
jurisdiction existed in New Hampshire notwithstanding the fact that Keeton did not
reside in New Hampshire.76 This analysis represents the fact that the Court is
generally more concerned with the defendant’s connections to the forum state rather
than its connections with the plaintiff.77 For instance, even though the plaintiff did
not live in New Hampshire, she still experienced an injury there created by the
defendant, as New Hampshire residents read the alleged libel.78 The crux of the
analysis is therefore where the effect of the tort was, not the location of the plaintiff.
The Keeton test does not provide a conclusive answer to interstate toxic tort
personal jurisdiction. It seems unlikely that the business connection envisioned by
Keeton could be equated to intentional pollution that happens to pollute an adjacent
state and thus personal jurisdiction may be wanting.

2.

Calder v. Jones

Released alongside Keeton, Calder v. Jones sought to further clarify
intentional tort analysis.79 The plaintiff, Shirley Jones, lived and worked in
California.80 The relevant defendants were reporters for the National Enquirer, a
Florida corporation headquartered in Florida.81 The National Enquirer published a
national weekly newspaper with a circulation of over 5 million issues; 600,000 of
those were sold in California.82 The reporters were Florida residents with minimal
contacts to California, though their story relied on sources in California.83 In a 1979
issue, the National Enquirer allegedly libeled Shirley Jones.84 She sued, among
others, the reporters of the particular article in California state court.85 The question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether the reporters were subject to personal
jurisdiction in California for their actions in Florida.86 In a unanimous decision
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the reporters had sufficient
minimum contacts with California so as to give California jurisdiction.87 Specifically,
75.

Id. at 779-80.

76.

Id. at 774-75.

77.

See id. at 775.

78.

Id. at 775-76.

79.

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

80.

Id. at 785.

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 787-88.

87.

Id. at 791.
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jurisdiction was warranted over the reporters “based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida
conduct in California.”88 Furthermore, the writers’ contacts with California were
ample: “the article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in
terms both of [plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California.”89 Effectively, “California [was] the focal
point both of the story and of the harm suffered.”90 Critical to this conclusion was
the fact that this was not “mere untargeted negligence.”91 Instead, the Court noted
that the reporters’ intentional and tortious actions “were expressly aimed at
California” as they both knew that the article “would have a potentially devastating
impact” on the plaintiff.92 Note that the meaning of “intentional” in this context is
not necessarily that the defendants intended to injure the plaintiff; instead,
“intention” should be interpreted as an intentional action that defendants were aware
may lead to certain effects in another state.93 In short, the action must be intentional,
not the outcome.
Calder stands for the proposition that with respect to intentional torts,
knowingly causing an injury to a resident in another state may be sufficient for a
finding of personal jurisdiction.94 Even if a defendant never sets foot in, say,
California, they may nevertheless be subject to suit in California solely based on the
effects of their actions in another state. Calder therefore appears to support a finding
of personal jurisdiction in an interstate toxic tort. Applied to our hypothetical, if
Hobbs intentionally discharges pollutants into a river in Michigan and is aware of
the potential for adverse effects in the City of Cedar, Hobbs will likely be subject to
suit in Ohio based on Calder’s framework.

3.

Walden v. Fiore

The third relevant intentional tort case is Walden v. Fiore. Released in 2014,
Walden significantly limited the Calder framework.95 The defendant, a police officer
and deputized agent of the DEA, was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson
Airport.96 His work consisted of routine stops and other functions to support the

88.

Id. at 783.

89.

Id. at 788-89.

90.

Id. at 789.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93. Id. (“[T]heir intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.
[They] wrote and . . . edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon
respondent.”).
94. Id. at 790 (“An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from
persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California.”).
95.

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014).

96

Id. at 279.
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DEA’s “airport drug interdiction program.”97 Plaintiffs, residents of both California
and Nevada, were a couple flying to Nevada from Puerto Rico with a layover in
Atlanta.98 Upon arriving at the airport in Puerto Rico, they were stopped by DEA
agents.99 During the stop, agents discovered nearly $100,000 in cash in their
luggage.100 Plaintiffs then boarded their plane to Atlanta while DEA agents notified
personnel in Atlanta about the cash.101 Upon arriving at the Atlanta airport, plaintiffs
were again stopped and their cash was seized by the defendant.102 Although the funds
were eventually returned, the defendant had falsified reports to justify the seizure of
funds.103 The plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendant in Nevada court seeking
monetary damages for the alleged unlawful seizure.104
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Nevada did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.105 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas opened
with two broad maxims. First, the analysis must look to the “relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”106 Second, the defendant’s conduct “must
create a substantial connection with the forum State.”107 In light of these maxims, the
Court concluded that the defendant did not have the necessary relationship with
Nevada for an exercise of personal jurisdiction.108 His only relevant contact with
Nevada was his interaction with the plaintiffs, who happened to be from Nevada.109
But, minimum contacts analysis “looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”110 “The
plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum;” therefore
the officer lacked the necessary links with Nevada.111
In essence, Walden served to clarify the intentional tort framework. Prior
to Walden, a court could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who had intentional
and tortious actions if it was foreseeable that those actions would cause a particular
effect in another state.112 After Walden, the effects caused by an intentional action
97.

Id.

98.

Id. at 280.

99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 281.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 282.
106. Id. at 284
107. Id.
108. Id. at 288.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 285.
111. Id.
112. See generally Calder, 465 U.S. 783.
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had to connect “the defendant’s conduct to [a particular State], not just to a plaintiff
who lived there” for a finding of personal jurisdiction.113 Thus, Walden distinguished
Calder by clarifying that a connection to the plaintiff alone was not a sufficient basis
to exercise personal jurisdiction. In Calder, the defendant created the necessary
contacts with California because the intentional tort occurred in California, as
“publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel.”114 The effect of the tort
connected the defendants in Calder to California, not the fact that the plaintiff
resided there. In contrast, in Walden, the defendant’s only connection with Nevada
was the fact that he had harmed persons who happened to be from Nevada, but a
connection stemming from the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff was not
sufficient for a finding of personal jurisdiction.115
Walden narrowed intentional tort personal jurisdiction, thus making it more
difficult to justify a finding of personal jurisdiction in our interstate toxic tort
problem. The courts have struggled with the analysis as applied to interstate toxic
torts, resulting in opinions employing differing types of analysis.116

II. INCONSISTENT ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATED
Lower courts have struggled to apply the above framework to contemporary
toxic tort cases. The following cases illustrate why the current personal jurisdiction
analysis can lead to inconsistent results, particularly in the context of toxic torts.
First, this section will outline relevant cases that have found for personal jurisdiction
in interstate toxic torts post Walden. Second, this section will outline relevant cases
that have used similar analysis in factually analogous cases to find a lack of personal
jurisdiction. Third, this section will compare the analysis as applied to our running
hypothetical.

A. Cases That Support a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction
1.

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.

In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit addressed
interstate toxic torts and personal jurisdiction post Walden.117 Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd. (“Teck”), a Canadian corporation, operated a lead-zinc smelter in British
Columbia.118 The smelter generated hazardous materials, which Teck disposed of into
113. Walden, 571 U.S. at 289.
114. Id. (“Indeed, because publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel. . . .” (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976))).
115. Id. at 288-89.
116. See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018); TV Azteca v.
Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016).
117. Pakootas, 905 F.3d 565.
118. Id. at 572.
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the Columbia River.119 The discharge was carried downstream into the United States,
leading to significant pollution in the Upper Columbia River.120 After some years,
the EPA initiated discussions with Teck and subsequently issued an order directing
Teck to start surveying the Upper Columbia River for cleanup projects.121 Teck failed
to comply, prompting Joseph Pakootas to file a citizen suit in Washington federal
court seeking to compel Teck’s compliance with the EPA Order.122 Notwithstanding
the litigation’s procedural complexity, a key issue throughout the litigation was the
basis for personal jurisdiction over Teck, given its status as a Canadian corporation
with no presence in the U.S.123 The district court determined that personal
jurisdiction was warranted, which Teck ultimately appealed to the Ninth Circuit.124
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of personal jurisdiction.125 In its
decision, the court employed a Calder type analysis, stating that with respect to
intentional torts, there were three requirements for personal jurisdiction: (1) “an
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.”126 The court concluded
that Teck had committed an intentional act as it had “expressly aimed its waste at
the State of Washington.”127 The court reasoned that Teck had “expressly aimed its
waste” because Teck knew that the Columbia River carried the waste into
Washington but still continued to discharge its waste into the river.128 Thus, Teck
must have known “that its waste was aimed at the State of Washington.”129 Teck
argued that it had aimed its waste only at the Columbia River, but the court dismissed
this line of reasoning because the Columbia was aimed at Washington and “rivers are
nature’s conveyor belts.”130 Thus, even though Teck had not targeted Washington in
the traditional sense, through its continued targeting of the Columbia and its
knowledge that the Columbia was “aimed” at Washington, the court considered those
actions to be “expressly aimed at the forum State.” 131

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 573.
122. Id.
123. Id. (Teck argued that personal jurisdiction was not warranted because its “smelter’s discharges
into the Columbia River were not expressly aimed at Washington.”).
124. Id. at 574.
125. Id. at 578.
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id. at 577-578.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 578.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Triad Hunter, LLC v. Eagle Natrium, LLC

In a different case, the Seventh District Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled on
interstate toxic torts and personal jurisdiction in Triad Hunter v. Eagle Natrium.132
Triad Hunter (“Triad”), a Delaware corporation with an office in Ohio, was engaged
in the exploration of oil and gas in Ohio.133 In 2014, Triad Hunter purchased mineral
rights along a certain portion of the Ohio River.134 At this time, Triad had drilled
three wells but did not discover damage in one of them until years later.135 Upon this
discovery, Triad subsequently drilled a new well but discovered salt water, toxic gas,
and pressure in the underground formation.136 These abnormalities were allegedly a
result of mining activities on the other side of the river (in West Virginia) by a
manufacturing plant owned by Eagle Natrium (“Eagle”), a Delaware company
headquartered in Texas.137 Triad sued Eagle in Ohio state court, alleging that Eagle
had improperly mined under their site.138 Eagle responded by challenging Ohio’s
jurisdiction.139 The Ohio trial court found a lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding
that Eagle, the defendant, did not have “purposeful minimum contacts within the
State of Ohio.”140 Triad then appealed the decision to the Ohio Court of Appeals.141
Upon appeal, the question presented was whether the defendant’s
“subsurface injection of fluids originating in West Virginia that trespass[ed] upon
and cause[d] injury to property Ohio” subjected them to personal jurisdiction in
Ohio.142 Under Ohio law, an exercise of personal jurisdiction is warranted if: “(1) the
defendant purposefully availed [themselves] of the privilege of acting in the forum
state or causing a consequence in the forum state; (2) the cause of action arose from
the defendant’s activities in the forum state; and (3) the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant have a substantial enough connection with the
forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction . . . reasonable.”143 The court
concluded that these elements were met and thus a finding of personal jurisdiction
was sufficient.144 First, citing Pakootas, the court concluded that the purposeful
availment prong was satisfied as “continuing to release a substance while knowing it
132. Triad Hunter v. Eagle Natrium, 132 N.E.3d 1272 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019).
133. Id. at 1276.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1277.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1278.
140. Id. at 1280.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1282.
144. Id. at 1285.
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travels to a jurisdiction is considered purposeful direction of efforts toward that
jurisdiction.”145 Prongs two and three were met as well; the cause of action arose from
the mining and the defendant’s acts had a substantial enough connection to make
personal jurisdiction reasonable.146

3.

Ex parte Aladdin Manufacturing Corporation et al.

The Alabama Supreme Court similarly addressed toxic torts and personal
jurisdiction in Aladdin Manufacturing et al in 2020.147 In rather complicated litigation,
Alabama municipal water boards sought to sue several defendants who were carpet
and chemical manufacturers in Georgia.148 The municipal water boards alleged that
the Georgia manufacturer’s actions led to contamination of the municipalities’ waterintake sites.149 Unlike Pakootas and Triad Hunter, here, the defendants did not directly
release the contaminants.150 Instead, defendants discharged the toxic chemicals into
industrial wastewater, which was then treated at a wastewater-treatment plant in
Georgia, where it was then sprayed over a 9,800 acre area.151 Runoff from that area
then entered a tributary of a river that transported the discharge into Alabama,
contaminating the water at the two municipalities.152 It was unclear from the record
if the defendants were aware of this chain of events, but as this was an interlocutory
appeal the court assumed that the “defendants knew or should have known from
publicly available reports of the EPA and from published studies that the PFCcontaining chemicals . . . were polluting the . . . River, which flow[ed] . . . into
Alabama.”153 Defendants challenged the finding of personal jurisdiction in Alabama,
appealing the case to the Alabama Supreme Court.154
The question presented was whether out-of-state defendants allegedly
causing environmental pollution in Alabama could be subjected to personal
jurisdiction in Alabama.155 The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the finding of
personal jurisdiction in Alabama.156 The defendants argued that personal jurisdiction
was not warranted because none of their conduct had occurred in Alabama and their
use of a third-party for waste water treatment in Georgia meant that they had not
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So.3d 214 (Ala. 2019).
148. Id. at 221-224.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 232.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 221.
156. Id. at 239.
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undertaken any conduct aimed at Alabama.157 The court dismissed this argument,
concluding that through “knowingly discharging . . . chemicals in their industrial
wastewater, knowing they were ineffectively treated . . . and knowing that the
[chemicals] would end up in the Coosa River, which flows into Alabama, the . . .
defendants . . . purposefully directed their actions at Alabama.”158 Thus, the
defendants had sufficient contacts with Alabama to support a finding of personal
jurisdiction in Alabama.159

4.

Considering the Cases Together

Pakootas, Teck, and Aladdin all stand for the proposition that with
intentional torts, knowingly discharging a pollutant into, say, a river, with the
knowledge that those would end up in a particular state, constitutes targeting a
particular state, thus warranting a finding of personal jurisdiction.
The resulting analysis equates foreseeability to express targeting.
Considering our hypothetical, the analysis under this framework is fairly
straightforward. As Hobbs discharged pollutants into a river that it knew would end
up in Ohio, it thus targeted Ohio and a personal jurisdiction finding was warranted.
But this analysis can lead to inconsistencies. The case below will illustrate why this
sort of analysis does not always guarantee a finding of personal jurisdiction in
analogous fact patterns.

B. A Case that does not Support a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction
Despite analogous fact patterns, the case below employs a different analysis,
producing a different outcome. While this is not a toxic tort case, it presents similar
factual patterns that in theory should warrant the same analysis.

1.

TV Azteca v. Ruiz

In TV Azteca v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court of Texas was presented with a
defamation case.160 The plaintiff, Trevino, was a famous Mexican recording artist.161
In a major scandal in the 1990s, she was charged with sexual assault and kidnapping
in Brazil, but was ultimately acquitted.162 Following her acquittal, she moved to
Texas.163 In the late 2000s, on the ten-year anniversary of the scandal, various
157. Id. at 232.
158. Id. at 238.
159. Id.
160. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016).
161. Id. at 35.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Mexican television broadcasting companies ran stories rehashing the scandal.164
Trevino proceeded to sue two of the broadcasting companies, TV Azteca and
Publimax, and a news anchor, a Mexican citizen, in Texas state court, alleging
defamation.165 The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Texas court.166 The
dispute was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.167
The question presented was whether “a television broadcast that originates
outside Texas but travels into the state can support personal jurisdiction over the
broadcaster in Texas.”168 Though the court ultimately found that personal
jurisdiction was warranted, the court held that mere knowledge of effects in another
state could not alone support a finding of personal jurisdiction.169 For instance, the
court concluded that the fact that the defendants knew “that the brunt of the injury
[would] be felt by a particular resident in the forum state” was insufficient to support
a finding of personal jurisdiction.170 Crucial to this analysis was the distinction
between “directing a tort at an individual who happens to live in a particular state
and directing a tort at the state.”171 Thus, “the mere fact that [defendants] directed
defamatory statements at a plaintiff who live[d] in and allegedly suffered injuries in
Texas, without more, d[id] not establish” personal jurisdiction.172
Under this framework, personal jurisdiction would likely not be warranted
in our hypothetical. Hobbs’ knowledge that the pollutants would end up in the City
of Cedar and potentially have adverse effects would not be sufficient for targeting
and thus personal jurisdiction would be lacking.

C. A Summary: How Toxic Torts Can Create Inconsistent Outcomes
Under the Ninth Circuit, Ohio case law, and Alabama case law, jurisdiction
would be proper in our hypothetical (Hobbs knowingly discharging pollutants into a
river that carried them into Ohio).173 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Pakootas would warrant a finding of personal jurisdiction, as Hobbs was aware that
their discharge was being carried into Cedar, Ohio and thus had aimed at Ohio

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 36.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 43, 47 (Jurisdiction was based on the defendants’ targeting of Texas through their
broadcasting. The court concluded that personal jurisdiction was warranted because defendants had
“continuously and deliberately exploited’ the Texas market.”).
170. Id. at 40.
171. Id. at 43.
172. Id.
173. See generally Pakootas, 905 F.3d 565; Triad Hunter,132 N.E.3d 1272; See Aladdin
Manufacturing, 305 So.3d 214.
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through “nature’s conveyor belts.”174 The Ohio Court of Appeals would hold
similarly, as “continuing to release a substance while knowing it travels to a
jurisdiction is considered purposeful direction of efforts toward that jurisdiction.”175
Jurisdiction would be proper in Alabama as well, even if there was an intervening
third party between Hobbs and the city of Cedar.176 The Alabama Supreme Court
would hold that jurisdiction is proper because by continuing to send discharge despite
knowing where it would end up, Hobbs had “knowingly and directly aimed tortious
actions” at Cedar.177
However, under the framework articulated by the Texas Supreme Court,
personal jurisdiction would likely be wanting.178 Even though Hobbs was aware of
the effect on the city of Cedar, foreseeability would not be enough to create
purposeful availment.
Our hypothetical therefore reflects the inadequacies of the current case law
on interstate toxic torts. Understandably, courts are sympathetic to plaintiffs wanting
to sue out of state polluters in their home states, but by equating foreseeability to
targeting they have laid the groundwork for inconsistent judicial opinions. Courts
can exercise jurisdiction on out of state polluters, but they need to acknowledge that
toxic torts do not easily map onto the Calder effects test.

III.A BETTER FITTING FRAMEWORK
Indeed, it is understandable that the courts have felt obligated to find
personal jurisdiction for out of state polluters. Otherwise, polluters could escape suit
simply by hiding behind territorial borders. However, the problem is that these
courts have attempted to fit interstate toxic torts into analytical frameworks that are
simply not conducive to fair (if you take for granted that assumption that out of state
polluters should not be able to escape suit in bordering states) and consistent
resolutions. Instead, courts should apply a different analytical test that emphasizes
the fact that interstate toxic torts inherently affect the state, thus creating the
necessary contacts, rather than focusing on the intent of the defendant. This approach
will provide for a cleaner minimum contacts analysis while ensuring consistent case
law. The following section will outline the proposed analysis by applying it to the
traditional International Shoe test of minimum contacts and traditional notions of fair
play and substantive justice.

174. Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 579.
175. Triad Hunter,132 N.E.3d at 1285.
176. Cf. Aladdin Mfg., 305 So.3d at 239-40.
177. Id. at 239.
178. See TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 34-35.
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A. Focusing on the State is a Better Way to Analyze the Minimum Contacts
Requirement
Under International Shoe and subsequent case law, the overarching test for
personal jurisdiction is that the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with
. . . [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notices of fair play and substantial justice.”179 The first step of this test is “minimum
contacts.” Through recognizing that toxic torts occur to a territory rather than a
specific person, courts can satisfy the minimum contacts analysis in interstate toxic
torts without having to stretch the meaning of “targeting.”
Interstate toxic torts are inherently territorial matters. That is, the harm
does not occur to persons who happen to be in a state; it occurs to a state where persons
happen to be. The Ninth Circuit, Alabama Supreme Court, and Ohio Supreme Court
found minimum contacts because the defendants in those cases had been aware that
their pollutants were reaching the forum state, thus they had “targeted” the forum
state. However, this analysis fails to acknowledge the pivotal role that territorial
borders hold in personal jurisdictional analysis.180
Various Supreme Court opinions have recognized state borders as an
essential part of personal jurisdiction analysis. Pennoyer, the basis for personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, stands for the proposition that “no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”181
Similarly, Walden, in limiting the “effects” analysis of Calder, also relied heavily on
the importance of state borders, reemphasizing the need for a connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the forum State.182
In Calder, the Supreme Court grounded its finding of personal jurisdiction
“based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”183 In Walden, the
Supreme Court limited the so-called Calder effects test.184 Specifically, the Court
articulated two prongs to consider when evaluating a defendant’s relationship: (1) the
relationship had to arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself” created and (2)
the analysis should look to “contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.”185 Furthermore, due process required that
personal jurisdiction be based on the defendant’s “affiliation with the State [and not

179. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
180. Instead, these decisions have predicated jurisdiction on continued awareness. See Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 579 (9th Cir. 2018) (“It is inconceivable that Teck did not
know that its waste was aimed at the State of Washington when Teck deposited it into the powerful
Columbia River.”).
181. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
182. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014).
183. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
184. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286-87.
185. Id. at 285.
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on] the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts” they made with persons
affiliated with the State.”186
The distinguishing factor between Calder and Walden is the connection (or
lack thereof) with the forum State. In Calder, personal jurisdiction was warranted
because the nature of the tort created the contacts with the state:187 “[b]ecause
publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel, the defendants’
intentional tort actually occurred in California” and thus the defendant had a
connection with the state itself, not just the plaintiff.188 In contrast, personal
jurisdiction was not warranted in Walden because the intentional tort happened to
occur to a person who happened to be from Nevada, and thus the “effects” occurring
in Nevada stemmed only from the plaintiff’s residency there.189 In short, in Calder,
the reputational damage stemming from the libel could have only occurred in
California, but in Walden, the tort could have occurred to a plaintiff from Nevada or
New York or Michigan.190 This distinction is critical: the crux of personal jurisdiction
analysis is “whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the forum;” not whether
the defendant’s actions affected a person who happened to be from a particular state.191
Because the connection to the forum is the crux of the analysis, it is crucial
to understand that toxic torts inherently occur where the injury is felt.192 For
instance, in Ex parte Aladdin Manufacturing, another interstate toxic tort case, the
plaintiffs asserted claims including nuisance and trespass.193 These torts occur in the
place where the injury occurs. Nuisance is defined as “a condition, activity, or
situation . . . that interferes with the use or enjoyment of property.”194 Trespass is
“an unlawful act committed against the person or property of another; esp., wrongful
entry on another’s real property.”195 These torts both can occur where the pollutant
is felt and where the pollutant originates from. To further clarify, in the instance that
a neighbor released toxic chemicals into your home, trespass would not occur the
instant those chemicals were released but rather at the point when they entered your
home. This fact is key to the analysis --Calder’s holding was largely predicated on the
fact that the tort of libel generally occurs where the offending material was circulated,
thus creating the necessary connections with the forum. Analogously, through the
186. Id. at 286.
187. Id. at 287 (“The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “effects” of the alleged libel
connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff.”).
188. Walden, 571 U.S. at 288.
189. Id. at 289-90.
190. Though note that the actual plaintiffs were from Nevada, this statement stands for the
proposition that the tort could have happened to a person from any state. Id.
191. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
192. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
193. Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So.3d 214, 221 (Ala. 2019).
194. Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
195. Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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release of pollutants, the defendant creates a connection with the state itself, not with
persons who happen to be from the forum.
After establishing that toxic torts generally occur where the injury occurs,
it becomes apparent that two prongs articulated in Walden to establish minimum
contacts are satisfied. First, the relationship necessarily arises out of contacts that the
defendant himself created with the forum State.196 It is not the case that a plaintiff
encountered a pollutant in state A and then moved to state B; rather, the defendant
released pollutants that spilled over into state B. The contacts are not created through
the “unilateral activity of another party.”197 Furthermore, under the second prong,
the defendant’s contacts are with the forum state itself, not with persons who happen
to reside there.198 To clarify, in Calder, the Supreme Court held that personal
jurisdiction was warranted in California because “California [was] the focal point
both of the story and of the harm suffered.”199 In contrast, the Court in Walden found
no personal jurisdiction as the defendant had no connection to Nevada outside of his
connection to the plaintiffs.200 The plaintiffs “would have experience[d] this same
[injury] in California, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled.”201
Applied to an interstate toxic tort, the forum state is a necessary element of the harm;
the injury could only occur in the place the pollutants reached, thus connecting the
defendant to the forum in a meaningful way.

B. Fair Play and Substantial Justice is Easily Satisfied
The second step of the test articulated in International Shoe is that the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Generally, this part of the analysis acts as a backstop for
exceptional cases, but it is still useful to briefly go through the analysis.202
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson outlined the general factors that
courts tend to employ: (1) the burden to the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest
in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief; (4) the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution;” and (5) the interest of several states in furthering social
policies.203
196. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (“First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant
himself’ creates with the forum State.”).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 285 (“Second, our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”).
199. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
200. Walden, 571 U.S. 277, 288-89 (2014).
201. Id. at 289.
202. Note that in Calder, the Court failed to even employ the “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” test. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 783.
203. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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Beginning with the first factor, the burden to the “outsider” defendant in
an interstate toxic tort will be minor as compared to similar instances of being forced
to litigate out of state. Case law shows that courts are generally only worried about
particularly unique burdens, such as making a foreign defendant appear. For instance,
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, the Court
found that forcing a Japanese defendant to appear in California was a severe
burden.204 The Court further clarified that courts should generally be hesitant about
forcing a foreign defendant to appear because of “the unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system.”205 Given the physical
limitations of toxic torts, there will rarely be an instance of a foreign defendant being
required to appear in the United States. A far more likely defendant will be one
residing just across state lines.206 This is not the type of “unique burden” the Court
envisioned in World-Wide Volkswagen so as to warrant against a finding of personal
jurisdiction.
Next, the forum State will have several legitimate interests in overseeing
the dispute. First and foremost, they will want to ensure compensation for their
residents. For instance, in McGee v. International Life Insurance, the Supreme Court
held that California had a “manifest interest in providing effective means for its
residents.”207 Crucial to this conclusion was the recognition that some plaintiffs
would “be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow [the defendant] to a
distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.”208 This is particularly salient if
plaintiffs tend to be low income and thus “[cannot] afford the cost of bringing an
action in a foreign forum.”209 The forum state will also have a genuine interest in
discouraging pollution within their borders.
Next, courts have generally interpreted the plaintiff’s genuine interest in
convenient and effective relief to hinge on the availability of additional avenues of
remedy.210 Interstate toxic torts will not present similar concerns, as there generally
will not be alternative methods of restitution that allow the defendant to defend the
suit “at home” and accordingly this factor will support a fairness finding.
Further, the interstate judicial system has a legitimate interest in having
toxic torts adjudicated in the forum state. Putting aside the normative assumption
204. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of. Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 102 (1987).
205. Id.
206. Pollutants are necessarily restricted by geography, thus limiting their ability to travel far
distances.
207. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. For instance, in Kulko v. Superior Court of California, the Court implied that the plaintiff, a
mother, did not have a genuine interest in convenient and effective relief in seeking to force her exhusband to appear in California for suit when there were other statutory mechanism’s that provided for
restitution and would not require the ex-husband to travel. Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 9899 (1978).
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that toxic tort adjudications should occur where the pollution occurred, judicial
administrability will generally be served by having toxic torts adjudicated in the
forum state. For instance, while this is a fact dependent inquiry, generally in toxic
torts the majority of the facts will have occurred in the forum state: witnesses will be
generally present in the forum and the harm will have occurred in the forum.
Finally, states also have a genuine interest in having the dispute settled in
the state of the injury. If plaintiffs were required to litigate at the origin of the
pollutant rather than the place of injury, it would have the perverse effect of
discouraging toxic tort litigation, thus promoting continued pollution. Given the
length of many rivers in the U.S., it is easy to envision the dispersal of pollutants
through several states. Occasionally, substantive policy interests will be served
through a denial of personal jurisdiction, especially when foreign defendants or
parallel statutory schemes are involved,211 but those concerns are not present in toxic
tort litigation. Of course, it is important to note that some states also have an interest
in promoting business and thus may consider toxic tort litigation harmful to their
business climate.212
Once minimum contacts have been established, fairness concerns will often
operate as a backstop. For instance, minimum contacts, coupled with the interests of
the plaintiff and the forum, “will justify even the serious burdens placed on the . . .
defendant.”213 The burden on the defendant will generally be slight and the plaintiffs,
forum state, and interstate judicial system all have sufficient interest in adjudicating
toxic torts in the forum state so as to warrant a finding that fair play and substantial
justice are not offended.

C. Purposeful Availment Is Not Required for a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction if
We Have a Territorial Touchstone
A broader lesson can be gleaned from the analysis discussed above: in
intentional torts, targeting is not necessarily required for a finding of personal
jurisdiction if there exists a territorial touchstone.214 Put another way, we can use
intentional tort analysis without imputing a targeting requirement if there is a
sufficient effect connecting the defendant to the forum state.
Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that purposeful availment or
targeting, while not a necessary element, is a useful tool for the jurisdictional analysis.
211. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98.
212. This Note does not address the policy implications inherent in this decision as they are not
relevant to the analysis, but it is still important to remember that the interests of several states can cut
both ways.
213. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of. Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
214. Though note that in stream of commerce cases, without an intentional tort purposeful
availment (or direction) is necessary. See generally id. at 112 (Jurisdiction in stream of commerce cases
requires that the connection between the defendant and forum State “necessary for a finding of minimum
must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
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In Burnham, a plurality held that mere presence in a forum State was sufficient for a
finding of personal jurisdiction, regardless of targeting or minimum contacts.215 It is
clear that the plurality did not consider “minimum contacts” so as not to offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” necessary in cases with
physical presence, as Justice Brennan argued in concurrence that all jurisdictional
analyses should be considered in light of “minimum contacts” and “fair play and
substantial justice.”216 In response, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, noted that
the minimum contacts standard was “developed by analogy to ‘physical presence’ and
it would be perverse to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of
jurisdiction.”217 Therefore, it was clear that purposeful availment and targeting were
not necessary for personal jurisdiction, as mere physical presence in the state could
be sufficient.218 In Calder, the Court conflated targeting to require that the defendant
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”219 The Court concluded that the
defendant’s “intentional [tortious] actions were expressly aimed at California,” as
defendants wrote and edited an article “that they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact upon [the plaintiff] . . . and they knew that the brunt of that
injury would be felt by [the plaintiff] in the State in which she lives and works.”220
While the Court called this targeting, it is clear that it was a different type of
targeting than that envisioned in World-Wide Volkswagen. There, the Court required
concrete actions by a corporation that indicated purposeful availment towards a
particular state, such as marketing to that particular state.221 In contrast, Calder
considered tortious libel against a plaintiff in a particular state sufficient for targeting
as the defendants were aware of the injury that would occur to the plaintiff in the
forum state.222 Later cases in fact clarified that “the crux of Calder was the reputationbased ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California . . . [and]
the strength of that connection was largely a function of the nature of the libel tort”
because the “intentional tort actually occurred in California” given that reputation
injury requires others to read the libel.223 Thus, the defendant had ample contacts
with California, given that it was “the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered.”224 The Supreme Court in Calder did not uphold a finding of personal
jurisdiction based on “targeting” but rather on the connections between the
215. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). Though note that this holding only
applies to “insiders” and thus would not support a finding of personal jurisdiction in our hypothetical.
216. Id. at 622-23.
217. Id. at 619.
218. Id.
219. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
220. Id. at 784.
221. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
222. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
223. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 287-88 (2014).
224. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
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defendant and the forum State stemming from the nature of libel. We now can see
that the crux of the finding of personal jurisdiction was not the targeting of Shirley
Jones but rather the commission of the effect in California. This distinction is crucial
to the analysis.
The differing views of “targeting” or “purposeful availment” taken up by
the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen and Calder illustrate that they are plausibly
nothing more than a useful factor for intentional torts analysis. For instance, in
Calder, contacts with California were ample, but a reasonable person would likely
conclude that the defendants had not literally “targeted” California by writing a
libelous article about a Californian resident. If that were the case, then “targeting”
could be equated to targeting a particular person in a particular state, which Walden
explicitly rejects.225
The above cases illustrate that “targeting” is not always a necessary
requirement for a finding of personal jurisdiction. In certain circumstances, the
effects, whether intentional or not, of a defendant’s action in another state may
warrant personal jurisdiction where the action creates a connection with the state
itself, not persons within the state. While Supreme Court jurisprudence continues to
insist on a “targeting” prong,226 the analysis above illustrates that the tests proffered
by Calder and Walden can be satisfied without the defendant intentionally targeting
the forum State. By acknowledging this fact, courts can avoid a tenuous and
inauthentic targeting analysis while still grounding their findings of personal
jurisdiction on concrete analysis.

CONCLUSION
Courts can exercise personal jurisdiction in interstate toxic torts, but they
need to ground their analysis on the role that territorial borders play. This Note
proposes that this framework teaches us that targeting or purposeful availment is not
necessarily a necessary element for personal jurisdiction. If we have a territorial
touchstone, we may be able to exercise personal jurisdiction without targeting. By
using this analytical framework, courts can exercise personal jurisdiction without
employing tenuous analysis that may result in inconsistent case law.

225. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum
State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’
contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.”).
226. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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